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Introduction
Designs laws, and discussions about designs laws, have become fashionable in recent years, particularly in the European Union and my own country, Australia. So, the question of “what is the future of design law” is both a challenging and interesting one. As a first step, however, some discussion of terminology is necessary.
The meaning of “design”
This is not an easy term to define: there is both a broad (lay) meaning and a more technical (legal) meaning. The broad meaning takes in many activities, ranging from “industrial design, urban planning, graphic design and stage design through to costume design, fashion design, product design and packaging design”.​[3]​  [To incorporate Locarno classification as well]

An expert Australian committee that reported in the early 1990s had this to say about the function of design in the Australian economy:
3.3 Well designed products are of substantial economic importance to Australia. The tradeable manufacturing industries, which include the production of major appliances, cars and trucks, industrial manufacturing, office furniture and components of all kinds, can compete in both domestic and export markets, either by having lower unit costs based on technological or other factors, or by creating a superiority or uniqueness of product quality, allowing them to demand premium prices. Adequate protection for designs must be given to provide an incentive to invest in the time and skill which gives rise to better product design.
3.4 The design spectrum embraces a wide range of activity which has grown with the developments in mechanically-based production technology. Because this transition from the artist-craftsman of the late 19th century to the industrial designer of today was a slow process, there exists much misunderstanding as to what ‘design’ is and where it fits within the intellectual property system. The difficulty in reaching any understanding of these issues today is that the legal concepts applied in the protection of designs, and the work of the artist-craftsman (‘works of artistic craftsmanship’) have their origins in the middle to late 19th century when the design was seen essentially as the ‘artistic’ component of a useful product.
…
3.6 The interest of the industrial designer is primarily in the relationship between the product and the user, and his or her work embodies such considerations as ergonomics, safety and convenience, as well as visual and expressive values. The skills embodied within the practice of industrial design frequently overlap those of related disciplines, not only architecture and graphic design, but also engineering design. On some projects it is almost impossible to distinguish between the work of the industrial designers and that of the engineering designers. This blurring of the lines of demarcation and overlapping of design skills is a significant factor in the development of design practice. In another sense, the design spectrum spans a range of design factors from aesthetics to ergonomics, to mechanics and electronics.​[4]​  
At this broad level, “design” covers both the way things work and are made, as well as the way they look and feel. Legally, however, the term is more limited, at least so far as the application of a specific title of protection is concerned. Thus, “workings” and mechanical matters have usually been left to the province of the patent system (if they are to be protected at all), with sui generis design laws being confined to just matters of appearance. Historically, this division was well reflected in the definition of “design” that was originally adopted in the Registered Designs Act 1949 (UK):
‘…“design” means features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament applied to an article by any industrial process or means, being features which in the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the eye, but does not include a method or principle of construction or features of shape or configuration which are dictated solely by the function which the article to be made in that shape or configuration has to perform.
But matters of “appearance” give rise to further questions as to the appropriate form of protection to be applied. Copyright law has long given protection to appearance in the case of artistic works which can exist in both two and three dimensions; there is also the possibility of appearance (get-up and shape) fulfilling the function of indicating source or origin, matters more generally governed by the laws of trade marks and passing off or unfair competition. Sui generis designs laws, therefore, sit somewhat uneasily between these larger and more traditional heads of protection. Aesthetics, consumer appeal, functionality and source are all potential components of any separate design system, and national laws have often had difficulty in deciding which elements belong, and, if so, to what degree they should be recognised, in such laws. It is unsurprising to find that this is an area of law in which many national variations are to be found, with limited uniformity across borders. Particular issues on which differences arise include:
1.	The extent to which aesthetics should play a role;
2.	The corresponding question as the role, if any, of functional considerations; 
3.	Whether there should be differing levels of protection, depending upon the resolution of the roles of aesthetics and functionality respectively; and, most importantly 
4.	the way in which overlaps with other forms of protection (copyright, patents, trade marks) are to be handled.
The last of these is, perhaps, the most difficult question of all: should cumulative protection be allowed, or should clear areas of operation be defined and applied (with the possibility of loss of protection where limits are exceeded)? National (and regional) laws excel in their disparate approaches: from the UK with five separate regimes (copyright, registered and unregistered design, national and EC) protecting designs​[5]​ to Australia, which attempts to place a partial boundary between two regimes (copyright and registered designs), with other countries such as New Zealand allowing cumulative protection where it arises under both copyright and sui generis designs law.   
Complexity, therefore, is a feature of this part of intellectual property law. A starting point, therefore, is to investigate the guidance on these matters that is to be gained from the relevant international conventions. In chronological order, the following instruments fall to be considered:
1.	The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 (but really only from 1908)
2.	The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (but really only from 1958)
3.	The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 1994. 
Berne Convention
The Berne Convention, as we all know, is concerned with the protection of works of “authorship”. These works must fall within the “literary, scientific and artistic domain”, as revealed by the following definition of “literary and artistic works” in art 2(1):
(1) The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.
Of this inclusive list, the underlined sub-category of “works of applied art” is most relevant for our present purposes. This entered the list at the time of the Brussels revision of the Convention that occurred in 1948, but the question of whether “works of art applied to industrial purposes” should be included within the scope of the Convention had been a matter of some contention at the two preceding revisions conferences in Berlin (1908) and in Rome (1928).​[6]​    
This issue arose in two ways: the extent to which authors’ rights in their artistic works should be protected where these works were used for industrial purposes, and the related issue of the extent to which objects made by ordinary industrial processes for purely utilitarian purposes should be protected as artistic works, insofar as they embodied artistic elements such as features of design and shape. Instances of the first occurred where works of ‘pure’ art, such as drawings, paintings or sculptures, were applied to, or incorporated in, utilitarian objects, such as wallpaper, curtains, cutlery, crockery or the base of a lamp. Examples of the second included such everyday objects as furniture, electrical fittings and motor parts which might still display some ‘artistic’ element in their general shape or appearance. These are not absolutely opposed situations, although it is true that in the first instance the ‘pure’ work of art precedes the industrial application, while in the second the artistic element is found in the industrial application itself. Rather, they represent the extreme poles of a vast continuum of articles or products in which artistic and industrial elements intermingle in differing degrees. In each instance, however, the problem is the same: should the fact that art is applied in the production of objects which also serve a utilitarian purpose deprive the maker of the status of author, and consequently of the legal protection that is otherwise accorded to authors?
Prior to the Berne Convention, various approaches to this question were to be seen at the national level. Many accorded some kind of limited protection to designs which were applied to articles, the earliest examples being found both in the UK​[7]​ and France​[8]​ in relation to textiles and other materials. This protection was usually distinct from copyright, and was closer to an industrial property right such as a patent. Novelty and/or some element of originality were usually required, and the duration of protection was generally for a more limited term.​[9]​ At the same time, it seemed anomalous that many applications of artistic works in the industrial sphere should be denied copyright protection where they quite obviously displayed artistic elements. Thus, in France, the view came increasingly to be held during the course of the nineteenth century that the makers of such objects were entitled to copyright protection under the Law of 1793, and likewise that an artist did not lose the protection which he enjoyed in relation to his ‘pure’ work simply by reason of the fact that it was turned to an industrial use, for instance, by using it as a design for a utilitarian object. In other words, there occurred a total assimilation of all works of art, however they were manifested or applied, to full copyright protection.​[10]​ So far as the separate designs laws were concerned, these continued to exist, but the possibility of cumulative protection under these as well as the copyright law was accepted. While this development did not occur overnight, it became recongised as the doctrine of ‘unity of art’, which has been explained by one distinguished commentator as follows:
‘The theory of “unity of art” has its basis in the refusal to make any distinction between “pure art” and “industrial art”. It extends protection insured by the copyright law to all creations of form, even the most modest, those which, on the “lower” frontier of applied art, depend on what is called “industrial aesthetics”. If finds its explanation—and, we think, its justification—in the idea that an adequate distinction is impossible between “major art” and “minor art”, all criteria to which one may have recourse to this effect being subject to the accusation of subjectivity or being powerless, in other ways, to solve the borderline cases.’​[11]​
While this may be thought to be an extreme view in its all-embracing nature,​[12]​ it had the virtue of being logical and avoiding the manifold difficulties that arise when an attempt is made to fix a boundary beyond which works of industrial art will not be protected.​[13]​ At the other  end of the spectrum, however. was the UK which maintained a far more rigid separation between artistic and industrial endeavours, and which, in the Copyright Act 1911, denied copyright protection altogether in the case of an artistic work which was ‘industrially applied’ (defined to mean the multiplication of more than 50 objects to which the work was applied).​[14]​ At the same time, UK law after that date did accord an unprecedented form of artistic copyright protection to three-dimensional objects which came within the undefined and somewhat uncertain sub-category of ‘works of artistic craftsmanship’.​[15]​ The latter was problematic in that, among all the other sub-categories of artistic work protected by the 1911 Act, it was the only one to be qualified by the express requirement that it be “artistic”.​[16]​
From the above, it will be seen that, in the early years of the Berne Convention, there were great differences in the approaches taken by member countries to the question of protection of artistic works in the industrial sphere. Accordingly, the question was not discussed at the early conferences of the Berne Convention, and was not raised until the time of the Berlin Revision. At this Conference, the German Administration and the International Office proposed the inclusion of ‘works ... of art applied to industry’ (‘oeuvres ... d’art appliqué à l’industrie’) in the enumeration of works in article 4(1) (the predecessor to art 2(1)), arguing in support that these works had recently been assimilated to artistic works in some important countries, and that:
‘... the artificial boundaries established between pure art and art used in everyday life can no longer be maintained, neither from a doctrinal point of view nor from that of practical necessity.’​[17]​
This proposal was supplemented by a French proposition to add the words ‘whatever their merit or purpose’ immediately after the words ‘works ... of art applied to industry’.​[18]​ Nevertheless, while there was strong support for these proposals from a number of delegations,​[19]​ there was ‘irreducible opposition’ on the part of certain others, in particular the English and Swiss.​[20]​ No amendment was therefore made to article 4 (now article 2(1) in the Berlin Act), but works of art applied industrially were dealt with in a separate paragraph (article 2(4)) which provided simply for the application of national treatment, without any requirement of reciprocity, in the following terms:
‘Works of art applied to industry are protected to the extent permitted by the internal legislation of each country.’
There were obvious imbalances in this provision, as authors of artistic works from ‘unity of art’ Berne countries would be denied protection in ‘non-unity of art’ countries, while authors from the latter would receive, in the former, the benefit of protection which they did not enjoy in their own countries of origin. On the other hand, it met the objections of the British and Swiss delegations, and so far as the former was concerned left the UK ‘free to determine if they [works of art applied industrially] should be protected as works of art or as industrial designs and models’.​[21]​ Furthermore, as an accommodation of two directly opposed points of view, it commanded fairly general acceptance: only two countries (France and Tunisia) felt strongly enough about this lack of reciprocity to make reservations in relation to this when ratifying the Berlin Act.​[22]​ The effect of these reservations was that both countries declared, in accordance with article 27 of that Act, that they would continue to apply article 4 of the Berne Act in place of article 2(4) of the Berlin Act so far as works of art applied to industry were concerned. As article 4 had made no mention of these works in the list of literary and artistic works, both France and Tunisia were therefore under no obligation to extend the benefit of their generous ‘unity of art’ laws to artistic works from other Union countries.
The ‘unity of art’ advocates, however, returned to the fray at the Rome Conference with proposals in the programme for the Conference prepared by the Italian Government and the International Office of the Berne Union to accord full protection under the Convention to ‘works of art industrially applied’. These involved the deletion of article 2(4), the inclusion of these works in the enumeration in article 2(1), and the amendment of article 2(3) so as to read: ‘The above mentioned works enjoy protection in all countries of the Union whatever their merit or purpose.’​[23]​ While there was strong support for these proposals from a number of delegations, ​[24]​ there was still opposition or hesitations from others, leading to various compromise proposals which sought to take account of these conflicting views.​[25]​ A sub-committee which was appointed to consider the matter failed to reach a firm proposal,​[26]​ and, finally, although a reasonably equitable compromise proposal based on reciprocity (to be known as article 2ter)​[27]​ was worked out in negotiations between the French, British and Norwegian delegations, this also failed to achieve consensus.​[28]​ As amendments to the Convention required unanimity,​[29]​ the result was that the Rome Revision made no changes to the Convention text with respect to works of applied art, and the position under the Berlin Act therefore continued. In particular, France, which was frustrated by the fiasco of these proceedings, declared that it would maintain its reservation under the Berlin Act, inviting other Union countries to enter into a restricted Union with it on the basis of reciprocity in relation to industrially applied works of art.​[30]​
The failure of the Rome Revision Conference to achieve anything as regards these kinds of works is a useful illustration of both the strengths and weaknesses of the Berne Convention, with its requirement of unanimity for the purposes of amendment.​[31]​ At the same time, it was clear that the time was not yet ripe for the adoption of even a compromise proposal, as there were still fundamental divisions between member countries as to how works of applied art should be treated. 
This question was finally revisited, and with more success, at the Brussels Revision Conference in 1948, which saw the adoption of the provisions which continue in substance today under the Stockholm, Paris Acts. In their programme proposals, the International Office and Belgian Government,​[32]​ repeated those that had been originally put to the Berlin and Rome Conferences for the inclusion of ‘works of art applied to industry’ in article 2(1), the deletion of article 2(4), and its replacement by a general paragraph providing that the works mentioned in the article should be protected in all countries of the Union ‘whatever their merit or purpose’.​[33]​ Once again, this proposal received the predictable support of the French,​[34]​ but as in 1928 it failed to secure unanimous support​[35]​ from countries such as Italy​[36]​ and the UK​[37]​ which were reluctant to adopt such a provision if its effect was to remove or reduce the capacity of national law to define the notion of a work of applied art.​[38]​ These countries also argued that account should be taken of the views of those countries which were opposed to the possibility of cumulative protection for works of applied art under copyright and registered designs laws.​[39]​ In this regard, however, the French delegation insisted on the need for reciprocity in relation to the conditions, extent, nature and duration of protection.​[40]​ Following consideration by a special sub-committee, the following amendments were proposed and approved by the Conference:​[41]​
1.	‘Works of applied art’ were added to the enumeration in article 2(1) after ‘photographic works and those produced by process analogous to photography’. The reference to ‘industry’ was deleted following an objection by the British delegation that this was restrictive, as it was possible to envisage the application of artistic works in domains other than industry.​[42]​
2.	Article 2(4) of the Berlin and Rome Acts was replaced by the following paragraph (which now became article 2(5)):
‘It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the extent of the application of their laws to works of applied art and industrial designs and models, as well as the conditions under which such works, designs and models shall be protected. Works protected in the country of origin solely as designs and models shall be entitled in other countries of the Union only to such protection as shall be accorded to designs and models in such countries.’​[43]​
Apart from renumbering (art 2(5) is now art 2(7) – see further below), this provision remains substantially the same in the Stockholm/Paris Acts. On the one hand, works of applied art had finally attained promotion to ‘list status’ as literary and artistic works in article 2(1). On the other hand, it was left to member countries to determine the extent to which such works would be protected under their laws on copyright or their laws on industrial designs and models. This reservation was in turn subject to a condition of reciprocity: where one member country only protected a particular work of applied art as a design or model, the author of that work would only be entitled to receive, in other countries of the Union, the protection that the laws of those countries accorded to designs and models. This removed the principal French objection to article 2(4) of the Berlin and Rome Acts, and enabled that country to withdraw its reservation in relation to that provision. The result of this was that works of applied art of Union authors would now be entitled to full copyright protection in France, as long as their protection in their country of origin was not restricted to that available under special designs or models laws. The reciprocity allowed under this paragraph only came into operation where the sole protection for a work of applied art in its country of origin was under designs or models legislation. If country A (the country of origin) accorded both copyright and designs protection to such works, country B (the country where protection was claimed) could not restrict the protection available to that work under its laws. In other words, if country B also accorded cumulative protection, it could not limit the foreign work to designs protection, but would have to grant full copyright protection.
On the other hand, the new provision had a significant gap, in that there was no stipulation as to what was to happen where a work of applied art was only entitled to designs or model protection in country A, but there was no equivalent protection available in country B, eg because country B had no designs legislation,​[44]​ or because the work in question did not qualify for such protection for such reasons as lack of novelty, failure to register in time, and so on. In these situations, the implication to be drawn from article 2(5) was that these works were not entitled to any protection in country B. Another problem arose where the definition of what was an applied artistic work was not to be found in national legislation, but was determined on a case-by-case basis by national tribunals. If the jurisprudence of country A took a more restrictive view than the jurisprudence of country B, could courts in country B limit the protection available to works emanating from country A accordingly? In other words, did article 2(5) allow for the application of reciprocity at this level? The answer to this seems to be that a restriction of this kind could not be made for the following reason: member countries were obliged to protect works of applied art under article 2(1), but it was left to each to determine the extent to which their copyright and designs laws applied to such works. However, it was only where copyright protection was excluded in country A by reason of the sole application of designs legislation that copyright protection in country B could be refused. Accordingly, if the only restriction of protection in country A was to be found in the jurisprudence of that country, the courts in country B were not entitled to adopt a corresponding reduction in protection.​[45]​
As stated above, apart from renumbering, art 2(5) of the Brussels Act was essentially retained in the same form by the Stockholm and Paris Revision Conferences, and the only programme proposals concerning applied works of art related to the duration of their protection, providing that this was to be a minimum of 25 years from their making (see now article 7(4)), and a consequential amendment to article 2(5) that made it subject to this provision.​[46]​ A far more radical proposition by Denmark​[47]​ for the deletion of article 2(5) altogether (leading to the consequence that it would henceforth be obligatory for member states to protect applied works of art without qualification) was ultimately defeated,​[48]​ and the only other change made to article 2(5) came from an Italian proposition to fill the gap referred to above as regards works which enjoyed industrial designs protection only in their country of origin and therefore had no protection in those Union countries which did not have industrial designs laws.​[49]​ Accordingly, the last sentence of article 2(5) (which now became article 2(7)) was reworded as follows:
‘Works protected in the country of origin solely as designs and models shall be entitled in another country of the Union only to such special protection as is granted in that country to designs and models; however, if no such protection is granted in that country, such works shall be protected as artistic works.’​[50]​
This now permits an imbalance in protection to arise as between different countries of the Berne Union. For example, an artistic work which is registered as an industrial design in country A which has non-cumulative designs protection will be entitled to full copyright protection in country B which has no special designs law. However, while there was a significant likelihood of this situation arising immediately after the Stockholm Revision, this likelihood has steadily diminished with the adoption in recent years of special designs laws by the great majority of Union countries (whether these are exclusive of, or cumulative with, artistic copyright protection).​[51]​ The real problem under the present Berne text is that, in the case of countries where convention obligations are capable of direct application, it may become necessary for the courts of such countries to satisfy themselves as to the applicable law in the country of origin of the applied artistic work for which protection under the Convention is now claimed. This is always a difficult process, and one that is avoided where the principle of national treatment is adopted in an unqualified fashion.
It will be clear from the above that attempts to bring industrial designs and models under the umbrella of full artistic copyright protection under the Berne Convention really came to an end with the Brussels Revision Conference of 1948. From this time on, more emphasis has come to be placed on the provision of separate, sui generis protection for these works through laws on industrial models and designs.​[52]​ At the risk of over-generalisation, it is now possible to discern the following three broad national approaches to the protection of works of applied art that are consistent with the Berne Convention:
1.	Cumulative protection of works of applied art under both artistic copyright and designs laws: Under this approach, if designs protection is unavailable (for example, because of lack of novelty, prior user, etc) or is not obtained, the artist can fall back on copyright protection. Perhaps the leading example of this approach is to be found in France under the ‘unity of art’ doctrine. Significantly, though, Berne (article 7(4)) now permits a limitation of the term of protection to 25 years from making. 
2.	Partial cumulative protection: under this approach, cumulative protection may be accorded, but not for all works of applied art. ​[53]​ Thus, national copyright laws may provide that if an industrial design or model is to receive copyright protection it must display some additional quality, for example, it must manifest some ‘marked artistic character’ (as under the Benelux Law)​[54]​ or ‘artistic character’ simpliciter (as under the UK and Australian concept of a work of artistic craftsmanship) or fulfil the requirements necessary for an artistic work (as under German Law).​[55]​ At the Community level, cumulative design and copyright protection, whether total or partial, is now expressly provided in art 96(2) of the 2001 Regulation, which specifies further that “The extent to which, and the conditions under which, such protection is conferred, including the level of originality required, shall be determined by each Member State.”​[56]​ The fact that the Regulation and other national laws recognise the possibility of cumulative protection to some degree is an acknowledgement of the ‘vagueness of the frontier between designs and works of art’.​[57]​
3.	Non-cumulative protection: This approach seeks to distinguish more precisely between artistic works ‘properly speaking’ and industrial designs, clearly excluding or restricting copyright protection in the case of the latter. The criteria for drawing this distinction vary considerably; for example, in Australia, copyright protection is essentially limited in relation to three-dimensional applications to products once an artistic work has been registered as an industrial design or the work is industrially applied,​[58]​ while in the U.S., the design elements of a ‘useful article’ are protected by copyright ‘only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.’​[59]​
There are, of course, a multitude of variations within each approach, but for present purposes it suffices to note that each is compatible with the parameters set by the compromise formula established under the Brussels and Stockholm/Paris Acts of Berne.. Otherwise, however, Berne remains silent on the subject of designs laws and what such laws might cover. The latter have usually been regarded as belonging to the sphere of ‘industrial property rights’ rather than authors’ rights, but as the next section indicates designs (and models) have, until recently, been largely ignored under international instruments concerned with industrial property. 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
The Paris Convention, of course, has three years seniority over the Berne Convention, dating back to 1883. However, references to ‘industrial designs’ and ‘utility models’ only came into the Convention text in 1925 at the Hague Revision Conference of that year when they were included in the following general provision in art 1(2):
(2)  The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition.  
Industrial designs, along with all the other ‘objects’ of protection under art 1(2), are subject to the general obligation of national treatment under art 2(1), and enjoy rights of priority under arts 4A(1), 4C(1) and entitlement to a grace period for their maintenance under art 5bis. They are also to be accorded temporary protection for the purposes of exhibition at official or officially recognized international exhibitions under art 11, and no marking of the goods can be required as a condition of the right to protection under art 5D. More curiously, there is a prohibition in art 5B against forfeiture of industrial designs by reason of either failure to work or by reason of importation of articles corresponding to those which are protected (added in the Hague Revision of 1925 and the London Revision of 1934).​[60]​ These provisions, however, actually predate any specific requirement under the Convention to protect industrial designs in the first place. This was not added until the Lisbon Revision Conference of 1958 which adopted art 5quinquies:
 Industrial designs shall be protected in all countries of the Union.
It appears that this was the sole survivor of a series of proposed amendments that contained a definition of ‘design’, a requirement of novelty, and a minimum term of protection.​[61]​ However, there was no agreement among delegates on any of these matters, although there was agreement to explore these issues in conjunction with the relevant bodies of the Berne Union and UNESCO. Concerns expressed at the Lisbon Conference about the problems of cumulative protection under both copyright and special designs laws were downplayed by the International Study Group on the Protection of Works of Applied Art and Designs (representing the Berne and Paris Unions and UNESCO) which followed the Lisbon Conference and which reported in 1959. This Group agreed that while it might be desirable to make a distinction between the appropriate realms for both forms of protection, this was not easy to do, and that cumulative protection did not really involve any practical difficulties.​[62]​ A similar view is implicit in a resolution adopted by the Congress of AIPPI in 1966,​[63]​ as well as in the WIPO Model Law on Designs which was published in 1970.​[64]​ Accordingly, despite the requirement to protect industrial designs under Paris, it seems clear that member of both Unions (Paris and Berne) remain free to determine whether, to what extent, and under what conditions, they will protect works of applied art under separate designs laws or copyright. Indeed, the following comment on art 5quinquies by Bodenhausen indicates the flexibility that countries have in this regard: 
Nothing is said about the means of providing such protection, so that countries may comply with that provision not only through special legislation for the protection of designs, but also through the grant of such protection, for example, in their laws on copyright or their provisions against unfair competition. What is necessary, but at the same time sufficient, is that, whenever the competent authorities of a member State define or recongize an object as being an “industrial design”, for example in view of its registration as such in the country itself or internationally, protection in some form be given to it.​[65]​ 
For sake of completeness, it should be added that, although there is a special agreement under art 19 of Paris on the subject of designs (the Hague Agreement of 1925 concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, revised London 1934, the Hague 1960 and Geneva 1999), this is concerned primarily with application and registration procedures and does not address questions of definition, novelty requirements, term or scope of protection. In particular, it does not affect in any way the protection accorded to works of art and applied art by international copyright treaties and conventions, or the protection accorded to industrial designs under the TRIPS Agreement​[66]​ (see further below). 
TRIPS Agreement
The only substantive requirements with respect to industrial designs arise under the TRIPS Agreement, where they are dealt with in their own Section (Section 4) of Part II of that instrument.​[67]​ Unlike Paris or Berne, the requirements here are quite specific.
Article 25
Requirements for Protection
1.	Members shall provide for the protection of independently created industrial designs that are new or original.  Members may provide that designs are not new or original if they do not significantly differ from known designs or combinations of known design features.  Members may provide that such protection shall not extend to designs dictated essentially by technical or functional considerations.
2.	Each Member shall ensure that requirements for securing protection for textile designs, in particular in regard to any cost, examination or publication, do not unreasonably impair the opportunity to seek and obtain such protection.  Members shall be free to meet this obligation through industrial design law or through copyright law.
Article 26
Protection
1.	The owner of a protected industrial design shall have the right to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from making, selling or importing articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy, or substantially a copy, of the protected design, when such acts are undertaken for commercial purposes. 
2.	Members may provide limited exceptions to the protection of industrial designs, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of protected industrial designs and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the protected design, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.
3.	The duration of protection available shall amount to at least 10 years.
These provisions are, of course, additional to those already provided for in Berne and Paris, which are, in any event, incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.​[68]​ The following comments can be made:
1.	As under art 5quinquies of Paris, there is no requirement that these rights should be granted pursuant to a system of registration, deposit or some other formality: in other words, both registered and unregistered rights can be accommodated under art 25(1).
2.	Given that they do not prescribe a registration system, they therefore provide no guidance as to the form that a registration system must take, if adopted by a TRIPS country, in particular, whether a system of substantive or formal examination is required. 
3.	The criterion of ‘independently created designs’ accords with the low threshold requirement of originality in some common law copyright laws, such as those of Australia and the UK, where ‘originality’ has been seen as requiring simply that something has not been copied from elsewhere.​[69]​ On the other hand, the requirements of novelty or originality appear to add something further, although the second sentence of art 25(1) is only permissive in so far as providing guidelines on what these requirements may mean. There were arguments in the TRIPS negotiations as to the terms to be used here, including proponents of ‘and’ rather than ‘or’ on the basis that a design could still be original in some circumstances even where it was not new. The final adoption by negotiators of ‘and’ indicates that novelty and originality are cumulative not separate requirements.​[70]​
4.	The last sentence of art 25(1) leaves countries with the option of denying protection in the case of functional designs, although the word ‘essentially’ may not have the same precision as ‘solely’ or ‘only’.
5.	The special case of textile designs suggests that copyright protection, without any formalities, may be the best way of meeting the obligation under art 25(2). In the case of Australia, this is met by a provision that seeks to preserve full artistic copyright protection in the case of two-dimensional applications of designs derived from artistic works.​[71]​
6.	The exclusive rights to be conferred (art 26(1)) are of a copyright kind, rather than an industrial property type monopoly right. The reference to ‘substantially a copy’ also brings in familiar copyright–type principles, at least in common law systems where infringement of copyright can occur where an unauthorised act is done in relation to the whole or a substantial part’ of a protected work.​[72]​ One commentator has suggested that the provision does not require that an actual copy should be made,​[73]​ but it is difficult to see the basis for this proposition.
7.	  Exceptions to these exclusive rights are framed by reference to the three step test derived from article 9(2) of Berne, with the additional gloss that these must ‘take account of the legitimate interests of third parties’. It might be possible to argue, therefore, that in appropriate cases, this would permit the imposition of compulsory licences.
8.	The minimum term of protection is 10 years, contrasting with the 25 year from making provided for in the case of works of applied art under article 7(4). The starting point for the 10 year term, however, is not specified, eg whether this is the time of first making or application of the design, publication, registration, deposit, etc.
While significant, in so far as they are the first prescriptions at the international level as to the content of industrial design rights, the TRIPS provisions are hardly onerous. Consider the rich variety of national designs law that are presently TRIPS-compliant: the unregistered design right in the UK,​[74]​ lasting for a maximum of 15 years from first recording in a design document or first making of an article to the design​[75]​ with licences of right available in the later years​[76]​ and the threshold requirement of originality,​[77]​ and the registered design system requiring substantive examination pre-grant of newness or individual character ,​[78]​ excluding designs whose appearance is “solely dictated by the product’s technical function”,​[79]​ and lasting for up to 25 years from the date of registration.​[80]​ In the case of Australia, our pre-2003 designs law had a system of substantive examination for novelty or originality,​[81]​ a maximum term of 16 years​[82]​ and protected functional designs;​[83]​ post-2003, our new designs law no longer has substantive examination pre-grant,​[84]​ is set at a 10 year maximum,​[85]​ still protects functional designs, and has elaborate exceptions relating to component parts of “complex products”.​[86]​ 
What does all this mean?
For all the rich diversity of national designs law options that may be accommodated within the TRIPS/Paris/Berne framework, it is surprising to see how little use is made (relatively speaking) of registered designs systems (by their very nature, it is impossible to quantify the extent of usage of unregistered design rights). Some years ago and long before the enactment of the present Australian legislation, I extracted the following figures on Australian designs applications, comparing them with trade mark and patent applications and registrations.​[87]​ As at 1991, the last year for which figures were then available, there were 21,800 applications for trade marks, 27,672 applications for patents and 3,945 designs applications.​[88]​ 









By contrast, by 2004-2005, the numbers of Australian trade mark applications and registrations were 53,319 and 50,123 respectively and patent applications and registrations were 22,530 and 12,235 respectively.​[90]​  Filing and registration statistics for designs in the UK have increased only modestly since 1991: there were 9506 filings and 9192 registrations in 2004-2005 compared with 8074 and 6271 respectively in 1991. On the other hand, design filings have increased dramatically in Europe with the impact of the Community Design and new national designs laws.​[91]​
Statistics can always be used in different ways, and I should confine my comments to the particular experience of Australia with which I am most familiar. In the years since 1992, we have had several major inquiries into design protection,​[92]​ including a most significant one by our national law reform agency (the Australian Law Reform Commission or ‘ALRC’), a number of protracted infringement and invalidity proceedings, and the ultimate passage of a new designs law in 2003. Despite this extensive use of ink, paper and other resources, the ultimate result has been only a small increase in the use of the system, and a continuing disconnect between users’ expectations of the designs system and what this can actually provide. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the ALRC conducted a survey of industry users and ascertained that a large number of respondents wanted something further from the protection that was granted, ie protection for technical and functional elements rather than just features of appearance.​[93]​  The following summary of responses is instructive: 
Of those who wanted protection for something more than just the appearance of the article bearing the design:
	51% wanted protection for the actual article bearing the design (ie both the article's appearance and function)
	58% wanted protection for the uniqueness of the article bearing the design.
	41% wanted protection for the way the article worked
	31% wanted protection for one specific functional feature of the article bearing the design.​[94]​
The relatively low level of applications under the new law suggests that this reluctance still persists and brings its utility – at least, from the perspective of would-be users - into question.
The problem of trade marks and unfair competition
A further issue concerns the overlap between designs and trade marks and, more generally, unfair competition laws. Common law actions for passing off have long protected such matters as shape and get-up where these have been used as indications of source and origin.​[95]​ The same now applies in the case of registered trade marks in many national laws.​[96]​ Is this something that should be avoided?
At one level, protection arising in this collateral way may be thought undesirable: if successful passing off actions can be mounted, then the need for specific registered designs protection is avoided, with the consequence that protection for design features can be obtained on an indefinite basis, long after the statutory period of designs protection has expired.  
In response, it can be equally cogently argued that the object of trade marks and passing off actions is quite different from that of designs law: to protect indications of origin, and that to deny protection that would incidentally give protection to features of appearance would be unfair. Furthermore, it will only be in the exceptional cases that such protection will be available. Registered trade marks, however, provide another source of complexity, to the extent that registration may be achieved on the basis of inherent, rather than just factual, distinctiveness. But is this ever going to be likely? It will be a rare case indeed in which a shape or aspect of packaging is so unusual and striking that it will satisfy the requirements for registration in the absence of demonstrated factual distinctiveness. And, if such a shape or aspect of packaging is capable of fulfilling a trade mark function quite distinct from any other condition of novelty or originality it may display for the purposes of design protection, there is no reason in principle why trade mark/passing off protection should be denied: in either of the last two cases, the owner will need to work hard to establish its entitlement to protection. The fact that there might be incidental protection for design features is beside the point.
The problem of overlapping protection in this area has not been without judicial comment. In the old case of Edge v Niccolls,​[97]​ there was no design protection in place​[98]​ and the successful plaintiff had also failed to obtain a valid patent for its bag of ‘laundry blue’ with a stick. However, the undesirability of obtaining this protection in a de facto way through a passing off action was dismissed by the court in view of the fact that ‘differentiation [of the Defendant’s product] within reasonable and economical limits was undoubtedly possible’, but instead of doing this the Defendants had sought to adopt the Plaintiffs’ ‘design’ with the effect that ‘customers believed that the Defendants were the same people as the Plaintiffs’.​[99]​ The question of gratuitous monopoly protection concerned some members of the House of Lords in Reckitt & Colman v Borden, but Lord Oliver of Aylmerton crystallised the question for the court as follows: 
In the end, the question comes down not to whether the respondents are entitled to a monopoly in the sale of lemon juice in natural-size lemon-shaped containers but whether the appellants, in deliberately adopting, out of all the many possible shapes of container, a container having the most immediately striking feature of the respondents’ get-up, have taken sufficient steps to distinguish their product from that of the respondents. As Romer LJ observed in Payton & Co v Snelling, Lampard & Co (1900) 17 RPC 48 at 56: ‘When one person has used certain leading features, though common to the trade, if another person is going to put goods on the market, having the same leading features, he should take extra care by the distinguishing features he is going to put on his goods, to see that the goods can be really distinguished . . .’​[100]​   
In Australia, the same issues have arisen, in the related area of consumer protection legislation, where traders utilise the misleading and deceptive conduct provisions under Part V of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to prevent rivals adopting similar marks and insignia, including shapes and get-up. Thus, in Puxu v Parkdale,​[101]​ to the objection that such protection might enable a trader to gain protection that might otherwise be available (or not, as the case may be) under designs or patents legislation, the court saw no objection so long as the consumer protection object of the legislation was being served. Mason J (as he then was) said:
Mr Staff QC for the respondent submits that the Patents Act and the Designs Act are directed to a field of obligations and rights quite different from s 52. In one sense this is so. It is the object of the two statutes to create private property rights. They confer exclusive or monopoly rights in patents and designs respectively and prescribe the conditions according to which these rights come into existence. With s 52 it is different. Its primary purpose is not to create private property rights but to regulate the conduct of traders by prohibiting them from engaging in conduct which misleads or deceives consumers. Enforcement of this statutory prohibition may enable trader A to prevent trader B from manufacturing or marketing goods which closely resemble those of trader A because the marketing of them will mislead or deceive the public, but this result, if it occurs, will be incidental to the enforcement of the prohibition—it is an unavoidable consequence of protecting the public from misleading or deceptive conduct. When s 52 is viewed in this light, there is no very strong reason for saying that the generality of its language should be restricted on the ground that it runs counter to the policy and purpose of the Patents Act and the Designs Act.​[102]​
In the area of registered trade marks, it is noteworthy that some laws have sought to place limits on what can be registered, such as article 7(1)(e) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation 1999 which provides:
1. The following shall not be registered: 
… 
(e) signs which consist exclusively of: 
(i) the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves; or 
(ii) the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result; or 
(iii) the shape which gives substantial value to the goods;
The last sub-paragraph may be thought to be the one that cuts closest to design considerations, but, again, if this is the element that denotes the provenance of the goods (through factual distinctiveness) this will now the source of the  ‘substantial value’ rather than the design aspects in themselves. In this regard, it is interesting to note that such a provision was omitted from the ‘new’ Australian trade marks legislation that was enacted in 1995.​[103]​  The need for such a provision is not immediately apparent, and, more generally, there is no compelling reason to exclude trade marks and passing off/statutory unfair competition protection for design features where there is deception or confusion as to the provenance of those goods.
What should be done?
If trade marks and the like can be safely left aside, the difficult issue of the relationship between copyright and designs laws remains. We now have elaborate legislative solutions in different jurisdictions, and international uniformity seems further away than it was even a decade ago. This is the case even after TRIPS, but is permissible under the present international framework provided by that agreement and the Paris and Berne Conventions. Let me suggest, however, that there is a simpler and more straightforward approach that is consistent with this framework. It is couched with respect to current Australian law, but I believe that it can be transplanted elsewhere.​[104]​
The starting point is artistic copyright, and the fact that ‘works of applied art’ are included within the scope of  ‘literary and artistic works’ in article 2(1) of the Berne Convention. ‘Work of applied art’ is a flexible concept which is capable of embracing artistic works that are exploited in a two-dimensional fashion (‘two-dimensional designs’) through application to surfaces and materials, such as wall paper, clothing, tea towels, carpets and the like, as well as works that are exploited in three dimensions where designs are applied to the shape or configuration of useful articles, such as chairs, tables, headlights, water tanks, coffee percolators and the like (‘three-dimensional designs’). Artistic copyright will generally come into play in the case of three-dimensional designs because of some pre-existing two-dimensional artistic work (a drawing, a plan, etc) where products made according to that design can be regarded as three-dimensional reproductions of the two-dimensional design. 
On the assumption that all such works are to be protected as ‘works of applied art’ (leaving aside, for the moment, the question of originality), Berne requires only that this be done for a term of protection of 25 years from their making. Countries can, of course, go further than this, and Australia is a prime example: we now allow a term of the life of the author plus 70 years to the two-dimensional design artist and the same term to three-dimensional designs where these fit the description of a ‘work of artistic craftsmanship’. or a ‘building.’​[105]​ In the case of other three-dimensional designs, the legislative policy is that copyright protection is restricted, at least in the industrial sphere, once a ‘corresponding design’ that would result in a three-dimensional reproduction of the work has been registered or has been ‘industrially applied’.​[106]​ It should also be added that entry to the safe harbour provided by works of artistic craftsmanship has usually proved difficult because such cases typically arise at the borderline: the works of the artist-craftsman (the jeweller, the goldsmith, the silversmith, the leatherworker, the maker of ornate cast iron gates) usually pass in without any particular contention, while the designers of a corkscrew in the shape of a rabbit’s ears​[107]​ or of cable knitted jumpers​[108]​ have met far more resistance. A maximum term of 25 years for all works of applied art, whether applied in two or three dimensions, might therefore make the dividing line between art and industry an easier, and far less contentious, one to draw: if all such works could be protected, the push to establish the near impossible, ie that something is a work of artistic craftsmanship (or even a ‘building’​[109]​), would disappear, but there would be no yawning lack of protection for those designers who have failed to seek a registered design. On this basis, there would be no need to remove the protection already provided for the true artist craftsman, who could continue to be protected in the same way as sculptors and architects/builders. The requirement of originality would remain, but this could be set at the usual low Anglo-Australian level of independent creation and sweat of the brow or higher, depending upon national preference or tradition (Berne, of course, has no particular stipulations here as to the level of originality required for any particular category of work, and it would be open to a country to prescribe something additional, if this was thought necessary).      
What would this mean for registered design laws? They could, of course, be left just where they are, as monuments to past endeavours and as object lessons in unhelpful legislative drafting. On the other hand, what need would there be for their continuance, unless there is something in our international obligations that precludes this? In this regard, Paris provides no problem: art 5quunquies simply requires that countries protect ‘industrial designs’ and says nothing as to whether these need to be registered rights or not. Priority periods would also not be a problem, in that protection would be automatically available without formality so long as the relevant Berne points of attachment were satisfied. National copyright laws, however, might have to be specifically amended to provide for the temporary international exhibition defence provided under article 11.               
TRIPS might provide some difficulties, but again these do not appear insurmountable: as noted above, registration systems are not required (accommodating existing national unregistered design rights) and the criteria for protection under art 25(1) could be readily accommodated under existing or modified copyright originality requirements, on the basis that Berne allows here for a significant degree of national variation. In other respects, the TRIPS provisions reflect a copyright-type approach, eg in relation to the rights to be protected under art 26(1), while, in other respects again, it is merely permissive, eg as to defences. Accordingly, it is submitted that it would be open to any Berne/Paris/TRIPS country to accord protection for designs purely as ‘works of applied art’ under Berne, and not to contravene any of these agreements so long as the minimum term granted was 25 years from the making of the work in question. 
Two further implications/consequences of the approach outlined above should be noted.
1.	The continuance of unregistered design rights will need attention, although this really only appears to be an issue for EC countries. In so far as these are a more limited alternative form of protection to a registered design, it is difficult to see what role would remain for them if more general copyright protection for works of applied art were to be available. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the TRIPS Agreement presently precludes such rights, even where their term is shorter than the prescribed 10 year minimum term under article 26(3) (as in the case of the present 3 year Community unregistered design). This is on the basis that art 26(3) does not exclude additional forms of protection for industrial designs so long as there is otherwise protection available for a minimum of 10 year: under my proposed system, this would be for 25 years under copyright. Unregistered design rights, however, might play a useful role in providing for a default form of protection where a putative work of applied art fails to meet the originality requirement for copyright protection. In other words, a short term form of unfair copying protection might well be justified, although strictly there is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement or elsewhere to require this as it would fall outside the scope of copyright or designs protection and it is difficult to infer such an express requirement in the terms of art 10bis of the Paris Convention (as incorporated by art 2(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.)  
2.	The matter of defences has been lightly glossed over above, but one continuing saga for national designs systems has been in the area of spare parts and repairs. How would this be dealt with under the proposed approach? While art 26(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides for defences that take account of “the legitimate interests of third parties”, any copyright solution would attract the operation of art 13 which does not have such a proviso. Indeed, as any spare part defence would inevitably implicate the reproduction rights in works of applied art, the relevant provision would be art 9(2) of Berne which, arguably, has a more narrow application than art 13 of TRIPS. Three-step analyses are always complicated and nuanced exercises, but is there any reason to suppose that the present limited defences provided under national designs laws​[110]​ would not pass each of the three steps in art 9(2)? There is also the consideration that where a defence or exception is motivated by competition or ant-trust considerations, this is not inconsistent with Berne obligations.​[111]​   
The solution proposed in this article may be far from perfect, but consider the complexity and uncertainty that it would replace if it were to be adopted. Furthermore, it has the unusual characteristic that it is readily permitted by the present international framework which, more often than not, is restrictive rather than facilitative when it comes to the adoption of different solutions in the intellectual property area. In particular, mandatory terms of protection often make copyright solutions unattractive. Here, however, the international system works in favour of a single and relatively simple solution. At the very least, a single 25 year term of protection for works of applied art would remove the current range of terms that run from 3 years to life plus 70 years and would provide industry with a certainty that it presently lacks, certainly in my own country. 
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